What is the impact of political "interference" on the level of infrastructure investment? Existing literature on both private and state-owned enterprises is schizophrenic on this point. In some cases, additional constraints that limit the ability of political actors to "interfere" are hypothesized to increase investment levels, while in others the effect is hypothesized to be negative. We argue that these seemingly contradictory conclusions are in fact special cases of a more general phenomenon whereby the constraints that political institutions impose on political actors interact with political actors' electoral objectives, which are in turn determined by the political strength of the investing entity's "interest group competitors." Managers of private and public enterprises thus assess the extent to which the status quo policy regime is credible as well as the likely direction of any future change in that regime, and invest accordingly. Our econometric analysis, which uses a panel data set covering the electric utilities of 78 countries during the period 1970 -1994, is consistent with these hypotheses and consequently points to the potential for a more general theory regarding the impact of political institutions on investment in the private and public sectors. 
Introduction
What is the impact of political "interference" on the level of infrastructure investment?
Existing research on both private and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is somewhat schizophrenic on this point. One body of literature focuses on the problem of underinvestment by private sector firms, arguing that uncertainty about the future policy regime leads firms to delay or fail to undertake investments in large, immobile assets. In contrast, the literature on optimal price regulation argues that if regulated firms perceive the policy regime to create soft budget constraints or cost-based reimbursement, overinvestment is likely to result. In the case of SOEs, the electoral objectives of political overseers may also lead to overinvestment if the political benefits of "white elephant" projects outweigh the (political) opportunity cost of funds. On the other hand, where the political benefits are slight or (political) opportunity costs dominate, investment may fall below efficient levels. Rather than treating these various perspectives as separate, we demonstrate that the inefficient investment outcome in each individual scenarios is a special case of a more general phenomenon. Our main arguments incorporate both the level of uncertainty about the future policy regime as well as the investing entity's expectation about the likely direction of a given policy shift, i.e., whether the shift will be favorable or inimical to its interests. This expectation depends on the electoral objectives of political actors, which in turn depend on the political strength of "interest group competitors" that stand to benefit from policies that disfavor the investing entity.
Consider first the problem of underinvestment by private sector firms. This literature argues that political actors 1 face incentives to "hold up" private sector investors with large sunk investments by redistributing some portion of the investors' quasi-rents to constituent groups that provide political support. 2 Investors are therefore hypothesized to reduce their investment levels in response to the threat of opportunistic behavior by political actors. Political institutions that constrain the behavior of political actors reduce the threat of opportunistic behavior and thus limit the extent of underinvestment.
The literature concerned with overinvestment in the private sector cases focuses on the case of regulated firms. A central hypothesis is that regulatory schemes which compensate firms based on their expenses create incentives to overinvest. This literature advocates the design of institutional structures that reduce political "interference" as an alleviatory measure. Specifically, when political actors are relatively unconstrained, they are likely to respond to the firm's costsaving measures by redistributing some part of its future profits to consumers, so that the firm has an incentive to incur higher costs. Because constraining institutions are seen as reducing the probability that political actors be able to redistribute the firm's cost savings to consumers, they are hypothesized to increase the firm's incentives to invest efficiently.
The literature that examines the (in)efficiency of SOEs emphasizes the problem of inefficient resource allocation, considering both underinvestment and overinvestment. On the one hand, public sector enterprises are viewed as being unable to raise sufficient funds to expand or even maintain the existing asset base. On the other hand, political actors seeking to curry favor with their constituents are argued to employ public sector enterprises to build "white elephants":
infrastructure projects whose economic necessity is dubious, but the construction of which benefits politically salient constituencies in the form of new jobs and associated multiplier effects in "targeted" subeconomies. The proposed solution in both cases is similar in spirit to that urged in the case of private sector investment distortions: to create institutional arrangements that reduce the extent to which political actors are able to impose their preferences on SOE investment patterns.
A concern that naturally arises when comparing all of these cases is that they appear to contradict each other: how is it that institutions that limit the influence of politics on investment decisions increase investment in the some cases and reduce it in others? One possible response is that the problems of underinvestment and overinvestment in private and public sector organizations constitute four fundamentally different problems, so that direct comparison of investment outcomes is simply inappropriate. Yet this answer is itself unsatisfying, at least to scholars studying economic organization, who prefer to think of various modes of organization as different breeds of the same animal rather than different species altogether (Williamson 1999 ).
Here we argue that the ostensible differences among the research streams do not in fact belie a contradiction, but instead reflect different implicit assumptions about the operative level of what we refer to as "interest group competition." 3 The concept of interest group competition builds on earlier work on the economic theory of regulation Peltzman 1976 ) and interest group theories of politics (Olson 1971; Becker 1983; Peltzman 1984; Denzau and Munger 1986) , and refers to the process by which firms seek to maximize the rents that they obtain from competition in the political arena through influence-seeking activities such as lobbying (Snyder 1992; Austen-Smith 1995; Stratmann 1996; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998) . 4 Our specific argument is that managers of all types of organizations are indeed concerned with the extent to which institutions allow political actors discretion over relevant policies, thereby affecting the probability of a policy shift. However, they are also concerned with the level of interest group competition that the organization faces, which determines the likely direction of any future policy change.
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In the argument that we develop below, we explain how these two characteristics of the policy environment interact to determine an organization's choice of investment level, and also how the explicit incorporation of interest group competition into studies of the link between political institutions and investment outcomes might reconcile some of the ostensible inconsistencies in the existing literature. The remainder of the paper develops this theoretical argument, applies it in the context of investment in electric generation capacity, and describes an empirical test using a panel data set covering 78 countries during the period 1970 -1994. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the effect of political institutions that constrain the behavior of political actors on investment in electrical infrastructure varies directly with the level of interest group competition faced by electric utilities. Investors in the electricity sector therefore do not merely assess the extent to which the structure of a nation's political institutions limit the feasibility of policy change by its government and then invest accordingly. Rather, they incorporate into their investment decisions both the probability of policy change and the extent to which a given change is likely be inimical or favorable to their interests. In short, our results suggest that political institutions and interest group dynamics must be considered in tandem.
Political Institutions and Interest Group Competition
We develop our arguments in the specific context of the electricity sector. Electricity provides an opportune context for examining the interactive effects of political institutions and interest group competition on investment as a result of the large quasi-rents associated with generation assets, the widely-acknowledged roles played by institutions and interest groups in the rate-setting process, and the common interest of scholars representing each of the perpsectives described above. We begin by considering the role of political institutions in each of the literatures. We then explain how interest group competition affects the incentives of political actors, and develop hypotheses that consider the joint effects of political institutions and interest group competition.
Political Institutions
The Hold-up Problem and Underinvestment by Private Electricity Investors. The type of hold-up problem emphasized in the literature on private sector underinvestment is especially severe in the case of infrastructure industries like electricity. 6 Existing work points to the small number of suppliers, the long-lived and highly site-specific nature of the assets in question, and the widespread consumption of infrastructure services as characteristics that present governments with strong incentives to expropriate the returns generated by infrastructure investment (Williamson 1976; Levy and Spiller 1994; Spiller 1996; Savedoff and Spiller 1997; Sidak and Spulber 1997; Bergara Duque, Henisz and Spiller 1998; Caballero and Hammour 1998) . Gilbert, Kahn and Newbery articulate this view in the context of the electricity industry, writing that the critical factor that influences investment in the sector is investor confidence "that the asset would not be expropriated, either explicitly, or implicitly through a stream of returns that would not be sufficiently remunerative" (Gilbert, Kahn and Newberry 1996, pp. 3-4) .
Institutions that do not sufficiently constrain political actors are therefore viewed as dampening the incentives for infrastructure providers to deploy capital. When institutional constraints are weak, the cost to the government of overturning prior decisions falls and the short-term gains that political actors might enjoy from a policy reversal rises. Investors respond to these hazards by investing less in infrastructure than they would in the presence of credible safeguards against changes in the policy regime.
Overinvestment by Private Sector Firms Subject to Price Regulation.
A large literature on price regulation of private sector firms focuses on the opposite problem, that of overinvestment.
This literature begins by considering cost-plus regulation under which a regulator sets prices that reimburse the regulated firm for its operating costs, plus some "allowed" rate of return on its invested capital. Firms operating under ROR regulation are hypothesized to employ more capital relative to variable inputs than an unregulated firm would when they receive a rate of return that exceeds their cost of capital (the so-called "Averch-Johnson" or "A-J" effect) (Averch and Johnson 1962; Takayama 1969 ; see also Baumol and Klevorick 1970; Zajac 1970; Bawa and Sibley 1980) .
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"Solutions" to the problem of overinvestment by regulated firms typically involve employing a scheme with "incentive" properties. In the context of cost-plus regulation, for example, overinvestment might be reduced by increasing the length of "regulatory lag," i.e., fixing rates for some predetermined period of time, which permits the firm to appropriate some fraction of its cost savings and therefore reduces the incentive to overinvest. A more extreme version of incentive regulation is a "pure" price cap system, under which prices are fixed "onceand-for-all," allowing the firm to appropriate the entire surplus associated with cost reductions and thereby completely eliminating the incentive to overinvest (Spulber and Becker 1983) .
As several scholars have pointed out, however, once-and-for-all commitments are an analytical fiction rather an institutional reality. In reality, the efficacy of any form of incentive regulation in reducing overinvestment-whether it be ROR with a lag, some form of price cap like the "RPI -X" system in the UK, or anything else-ultimately depends on the extent to which political actors can make credible commitments. In particulal, the details of a given incentive mechanism are always subject to adjustment by political authorities. Thus, if the firm knows that political actors will take lower costs this period into account when setting prices in the next period, it will expect some portion of its cost reductions to be appropriated by the government for consumers. This recognition reduces the firm's incentive to cut costs in the present period [Jones, 1993 #890; Laffont, 1993 #891] The solution to the problem of overinvestment by regulated firms thus lies in political institutions that impose constraints on political actors. By reducing the ability of political actors to expropriate the firm's future profits in response to low costs in the present period, constraining institutions are here seen to reduce overinvestment. In contrast, the absence of political constraints is hypothesized to increase the probability that political actors will respond to more efficient current behavior by expropriating future profits, thereby increasing the incentive to overinvest. (Duncan and Bollard 1992; Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Salant 1995; Indirect empirical support for the prevalence of such practices comes from studies of investment patterns of enterprises that were previously owned by the state but have recently been privatized. These studies consistently demonstrate that output expands while investment remains constant or even declines. (See, for example, La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) and the survey of related literature contained in Megginson (1999) ). To address the problem of inefficient resource allocation in general and overinvestment in particular, researchers examining these firms typically recommend that their managers be isolated from the political process and made to operate in a more business-like manner (examples include "commercialization" in the United Kingdom and "corporatization" in New Zealand). At the extreme, privatization is advocated as the only fully credible manner to separate the day-to-day operations of these enterprises from the problems of political interference and bureaucratic empire building.
State-Owned Electric
SOEs and Investment Shortfalls. While the objectives of political actors and state owned managers may be to overinvest, resource constraints may prevent the attainment of these objectives. Political actors must choose how to allocate available funds across myriad expenditure and transfer programs. Often, long-term investments that benefit wide constituencies, investments subject to high uncertainty regarding their returns, or projects that face strong political opposition in the short term are neglected in favor of more politically salient alternatives. Additionally, to the extent that raising funds through taxation and then allocating them through a political process introduces a cost wedge compared to private finance, the total funds available for public sector investment may be reduced as well.
As a result of funding shortfalls and the preference for politically salient projects, economically necessary new projects may not be undertaken and existing investment stock may outmoded or unreliable. Political factors are thus seen as "interfering" with market incentives by precluding investments that would otherwise be undertaken Once again, separation of SOE managers from the influence of the political process is the institutional arrangement typically prescribed to surmount such inefficient resource allocation. As in the case of overinvestment considered above, specific arrangements include increasing the power of the incentive scheme of the managers, allowing managers access to private financial markets and, ultimately, privatization of the state owned assets in question.
Interest Group Competition
As discussed in the introduction, differences in the implicit assumptions that research representing each of the various perspectives makes regarding the level of interest group competition faced by investors lead to what otherwise appear to be contradictory conclusions regarding the role of political institutions. The electric utility industry provides an excellent context in which to study this phenomenon because interest group competition plays such a prominent role. Indeed, Gilbert, Kahn and Newbery also point out that state enforcement of property rights in electrical infrastructure is necessarily balanced against state representation of "workers, voters and consumers" (Gilbert, Kahn and Newberry 1996, p. 4 in particular on interest group competition emanating from industrial consumers of electricity, which are commonly thought to play a major role in lobbying for lower electricity price Stigler 1975; Willrich 1975; Peltzman 1976 ).
The role of interest group competition is properly understood in the context of political actors' objective functions. Consistent with literature on the economic theory of regulation and interest group theories of politics, we view political actors as maximizing political gain by balancing electoral support in the form of votes, campaign contributions and the like from various interest groups to whom they "sell" favorable policies. The policies of interest in the current context are the price of electricity and the provision of white elephant projects.
The incidence of benefits and costs from pricing and white elephant policies varies for industrial and residential customers.
First consider industrial customers, who on average have little interest in white elephant projects, which by definition cater to targeted groups of politically salient residential consumers.
Industrial consumers are thus likely to oppose white elephant projects, as these projects increase electricity prices, which industrial customers do care about. Not only is energy is a key input for most industrial customers, but these customers are typically highly concentrated and have affiliations with industry associations or trade groups, so that they are also well organized for political action. As a result, industrial customers monitor utilities' rates quite closely and lobby for price reductions when they perceive that their expenditures on electricity are being used to finance construction projects whose justification has more to do with politics than economic necessity.
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Residential consumers have different policy preferences from those of industrial consumers. First, in contrast to industrial consumers, residential consumers care about white elephant projects. Such projects are highly visible and provided concentrated employment and financial benefits to the groups at which they are aimed. In addition, and also in contrast to industrial consumers, residential consumers are less concerned with pricing. The average residential customer uses considerably less electricity than does the average industrial consumer,
and numerous empirical studies have demonstrated that residential demand is considerably less elastic than industrial demand is. Moreover, residential customers are highly diffuse and poorly organized relative to industrial customers, further reducing their benefit-cost ratio of mobilizing political opposition to a given price increase. Residential users are thus likely to tolerate higher prices than industrial users do.
With these considerations in mind, consider the ramifications to a political actor of supporting or opposing a white elephant. Such a project clearly translates into increased political support from the groups that it benefits. The economic cost of these political benefits takes the form of higher electricity prices. However, from the perspective of political actors, it is the political cost-in terms of reduced support from those paying higher electricity prices-that is relevant. When a political actor's constituency is comprised primarily of residential customersi.e., industrial representation is low-the political cost of white elephant projects is low as well:
targeted groups enjoy the benefits, but the costs are widely dispersed over a diffuse group of consumers who are relatively complacent. In contrast, when a political actor's constituency includes a substantial fraction of industrial customers, the political costs of white elephant projects are commensurately higher. Industrial customers do not enjoy the same degree of benefits from white elephant projects, but they do bear the costs. Because they are well-organized and vigilant, industrial customers therefore act as a source of discipline against such projects.
Political Institutions and Interest Group Competition
In this section, we describe how the level of interest group competition from industrial consumers interacts with the level of political constraints to affect a utility's investment strategy.
By varying the level of interest group competition, we show that the problems of both under-and overinvestment by private sectors firms and SOEs are in fact special cases of the same general phenomenon. Our main argument follows from the recognition that, regardless of the specific regulatory scheme in case, what investors are ultimately concerned with is how favorable future policies are likely to be. The "friendliness" of policies, in turn, depends on the incentives and constraints facing political actors.
Private Sector Investment. For the private sector case, we develop our arguments in the context of price regulation because private sector investors in the electricity sector are typically subject to such regulation. First consider the situation in which there exists substantial industrial representation so that interest group competition is strong. In this case, political actors face incentives to keep lower prices so as to limit the potential for overinvestment by the utility. The ability of political actors to act on these incentives depends on the extent to which political institutions constrain their behavior. Highly constraining institutions reduce the ability to act, offering the utility some measure of protection and leading it to invest relatively more. Less constraining institutions, in contrast, make it easier for political actors to respond to industrial users' demands for "discipline," thereby reducing the utility's expected return and leading it to invest relatively less.
The situation is quite different when there is little industrial representation and interest group competition is consequently weak. In this case, political actors' preferences are weighted more heavily toward the interests of residential consumers, who benefit from white elephant projects and are relatively less concerned with price reductions. Political actors therefore face incentives to induce more investment by the utility. However, their ability to do so once again depends on the extent to which political institutions constrain their policy choices: more constraining institutions reduce their ability to act on these incentives, while less constraining institutions provide political actors with more scope to grant high rates of return. As a result, under weak interest group competition, the utility invests more under institutions that are less constraining, and less under institutions that are more constraining.
It is also possible to assess the expected impact of interest group competition on investment under different levels of political constraints. Where political actors are relatively unconstrained, the utility invests less in the presence of stronger interest group competition than it does in the presence of weaker competition. However, as political actors become more constrained, the magnitude of this effect declines because political actors become less sensitive to the influence of industrial consumers. The two schedules depict investment behavior when political actors are perfectly constrained, and also when they are relatively unconstrained. Investment behavior in the former case is insensitive to interest group competition, resulting in a slope of zero. In contrast, investment behavior in the latter case is sensitive to interest group competition, resulting in a negative slope.
Existing work on political institutions and underinvestment by private firms typically assumes (at least implicitly) that interest group competition is strong, as reflected in the relationship depicted on the right side of Figure 2 by quantities B and C-i.e., more investment in the presence of more constrained political actors and less investment in the presence of lower levels of political constraints.
However, this relationship reverses in the presence of weak interest group competition.
The "crossover point," labeled A, is where industrial consumers shift from being the politically subordinate constituency (left side of Figure 2 ) to the politically dominant one (right side of Public Sector Investment. We now consider investment by public sector organizations.
Here, the ability of SOE managers to make superfluous investments for either political or empire-building purposes again varies based on the strength of interest group competition face and the level of institutional constraints on political actors.
When interest group competition is weak-i.e., industrial consumers account for a relatively small fraction of electricity consumption-political actors promote white elephant projects. Because such projects accord with SOE managers' empire-building objectives, overinvestment results. However, the extent of overinvestment varies inversely with the level of political constraints. More constrained systems better insulate investment decisions from political considerations. 10 The lefthand side of Figure 1 again reflects this situation: more investment in the presence of weaker constraints, and less in the presence of stronger constraints.
As industrial representation among electricity consumers rises, the (positive) difference in investment levels under weak and strong constraint regimes declines. Even though managers of SOEs continue to possess empire-building objectives, political actors are no longer complicit in promoting overinvestment. The role that political constraints per se play in diminishing overinvestment in the case of weak political competition therefore declines in importance as interest group competition rises and political actors themselves come to exert cost discipline. The declining magnitude of the vertical difference between the weak and strong constraints schedules to the left of point A in Figure 1 reflects these relationships.
The situation to the right of point A-more investment under strong political constraints and less under weak in the presence of sufficiently strong political competition-captures the problem of underinvestment by SOEs. Here industrial consumers are so influential that political actors attempt to drive prices low enough so that SOE managers actually prefer stronger constraints, which now offer some measure of protection against the "excessive" discipline that political actors would like to exercise and thus provide the managers with more leeway to pursue their empire-building objectives.
Hypotheses
The foregoing leads directly to two main hypotheses: 
Data
As noted above, the dataset is a panel that covers up to 78 countries the period 1970 -1994. Although firm-level data would be preferable to country-level data in the context of our theory, country-level data are more readily available and national political institutions and interest group dynamics are always expected to play a role in the investment decisions of utilities. To be sure, country-level data are subject to additional concerns regarding unobserved country heterogeneity and the complex set of economic, demographic, political, legal and social variables that may influence investment. Our econometric specification and subsequent robustness checks attempt to address these concerns to the extent feasible. Firm-level tests of the theory that we propose are the subject of ongoing research.
The econometric specification to which the data are applied is derived from the following basic model of investment:
Before turning to the details of the econometric specification, the economic variables identified in the basic model warrant discussion. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these variables.
Dependent Variable
The measure of investment used as the dependent variable is a country's annual growth rate of megawatts of generating capacity per capita (?CAPACITY), or growth rate of "infrastructure penetration." The average annual growth rate of generating capacity in the entire sample is 4.4 per cent.
Independent Variables
Political Constraints. The measure of political constraints (POLCON) captures the extent of formal constraints on executive discretion and is taken from . Specifically, it quantifies the extent to which any one political actor or a replacement for an existing actor-e.g., the executive or a chamber of the legislature-is constrained in his or her choice of future policies. The first step in the construction of this variable is the identification, using political science databases, of the number of independent branches of government (executive, lower and upper legislative chambers, judiciary and sub-federal institutions) with veto power over policy change in each country. The preferences of each of these branches and the status quo policy are then assumed to be independently and identically drawn from a uniform, unidimensional policy space. This assumption allows for the derivation of a quantitative measure of institutional constraints using a simple spatial model of political interaction.
This initial measure is then modified to take into account the extent of alignment across branches of government using data on the party composition of the executive and legislative branches. Alignment across branches increases the feasibility of policy change thereby reducing the level of political constraints. The measure is then further modified to capture the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch. Greater within-branch heterogeneity increases (decreases) the costs of overturning policy for aligned (opposed) branched. Possible scores for the final measure of political constraints range from zero (most hazardous) to one (most constrained). The main results of the derivation (available in are that (1) each additional veto point (a branch of government that is both constitutionally effective and controlled by a party different from other branches) provides a positive but diminishing effect on the total level of constraints on policy change and (2) homogeneity (heterogeneity) of party preferences within an opposed (aligned) branch of government is positively correlated with constraints on policy change.
11 Table 2 reports the average sample values of POLCON by country.
Interest group competition. As discussed in Section 2.3, utilities face stronger interest group competition in countries in which industrial customers account for a greater fraction of electricity consumption (Peltzman 1976) . The measure of interest group competition utilized is thus the ratio of industrial to total electricity consumption (IGC). Data used to construct this measure are reported by the International Energy Agency (1999). Table 2 reports the average sample values of IGC by country.
In order to provide a feel for how the data correspond to the theoretical groupings, Table   3 uses the average sample values of political constraints (POLCON) and interest group competition (IGC) reported in Table 2 to identify three clusters of countries. The first cluster includes countries in which the level of political constraints is relatively high (one standard deviation above the mean level). The effect of interest group competition on investment is expected to be low in these countries. The second cluster consists of countries in which political constraints are relatively low (one standard deviation below the mean level) and interest group competition is strong (one standard deviation above the mean level). On average, we expect electric utility firms in these countries to adopt defensive strategies, investing less than would otherwise be expected. Finally, the third cluster consists of countries where political constraints are relatively low (one standard deviation below the mean level) and interest group competition is also weak (one standard deviation below the mean level). Here, we expect utilities to invest relatively more ceteris paribus.
Existing penetration level. The interaction of political constraints and interest group competition affects managers' perceptions of the expected marginal returns to investment.
However, the existing level of infrastructure penetration (CAPACITY), measured as megawatts per capita in the previous period, also affects the marginal returns available from additional infrastructure deployment. In this connection, the analysis shares with the macroeconomic growth literature (rooted in the models of Solow (1956) and Koopmans (1965) ) the insight that a country's existing level of capital stock (or in this case, infrastructure penetration) determines the level of marginal returns available from additional capital deployment and thereby influences the growth rate of the stock (see Barro (1992) ). The basis for this proposition in the macroeconomic growth literature is the assumption that a country's marginal returns to capital investment are diminishing, producing an inverse relationship between the initial level of the stock and the growth rate of the stock.
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A similar relationship is expected to hold at the electric utility industry level. 13 First consider intertemporal comparisons within a given country. In this context, the hypothesized inverse relationship between the existing penetration level and the penetration growth rate relies directly on the assumption of diminishing marginal returns to infrastructure deployment.
However, electricity production is a network industry that is typically thought of as a natural monopoly with increasing returns to capital over a large range of output, a characterization that at first blush seems at odds with the diminishing marginal returns to capital hypothesis.
The natural monopoly argument may well apply within the confines of a geographically bounded service territory. Growth in the extent and variety of demand within such a territory permits the construction of larger, more efficient generating plant configurations that exploit both scale economies and reduced demand variability. It therefore seems safe to assume that expansion of the generating stock within a service territory does indeed imply increasing (or at least constant) returns rather than decreasing.
14 Framing the analysis in terms of a national utility's long-run infrastructure expansion path, on the other hand, suggests a pattern of diminishing marginal returns. There are several reasons why it is intuitive to conceive of this path as a succession of discrete investments in geographically distinct service territories. Foremost among these are the "line losses" that characterize long-distance electricity transmission, which place direct geographic limits on the extent to which a utility can exploit scale economies and demand pooling across geographically disparate regions. Moreover, even where these line losses are not too great, exploiting scale economies or performing demand pooling over long distances requires substantial confidence in the long-distance transmission lines that connect regional electricity grids. 15 Additionally, in countries that rely heavily on hydroelectric power, the locations of natural watersheds may also lead to geographic segmenting.
If capital investments are made on a sequential basis and the total available returns in the individual territories in which a utility makes its successive investments vary, then the utility will rationally choose to invest first in those territories that promise the highest returns per unit of investment. These high-return territories are likely to be urbanized regions with large, dense and heterogeneous populations of electricity consumers. Subsequent investments in rural regions yield lower returns because these areas are more sparsely populated, and their economies are typically characterized by more homogeneous consumers and lower levels of aggregate demand.
Technological limitations and geographic variation therefore combine to produce a pattern of diminishing marginal returns to electrical infrastructure deployment over the long run, and consequently an inverse relationship between existing penetration level and the penetration growth rate in a country over time.
Now consider a cross-sectional comparison. Ceteris paribus, utilities in countries with
low existing penetration levels enjoy higher marginal returns to infrastructure investment than do those in countries with high existing levels, both because they have not yet penetrated the most lucrative service territories yet, and also because the costs of the best-practice technologies deployed in leader countries have typically fallen dramatically since the utilities in these countries initially deployed such technologies themselves. Moreover, utilities in leading countries are likely to have engaged in "learning-by-doing," the diffusion of which benefits utilities in laggard countries. Additionally, because generating assets are long-lived, utilities in countries with low existing infrastructure stocks may also be able to "leapfrog" early adopters because they need not anticipate replacement of nearly as much existing infrastructure and are generally less bound by prior complementary investments in old technologies. The upshot is that there should exist an inverse relationship between the existing penetration level and the penetration growth rate both within and among countries.
Capital Investment Budget. The next independent variable represents the government's capital investment budget, and is measured as real annual gross US dollar investment on capital spending per capita (CAPBUDGET t-1 ). It is important to recall that, in the vast majority of cases in our sample, the investment budget is not under the control of the managers of the electricity generation firms who make infrastructure deployment decisions, but instead represents a budget constraint set by the minister of finance, as discussed in section 2.3. Unfortunately, we are unable to observe the capital budget for electricity and therefore use the total public capital budget as a proxy. As this budget increases, we expect to observe higher growth rates of electric generation capacity.
Demand growth. The argument that electrical infrastructure growth within a country is characterized by diminishing marginal returns to capital over the long run implicitly assumes that the size and composition of the economy (and thus the demand for electricity) is fixed. Thus, a national utility first installs infrastructure to realize the potential demand in the territory that promises the greatest returns to investment, then in the territory that promises the second-highest level of returns to investment and so on. In reality, though, economies both grow and exhibit shifts in composition over time, which in turn lead to changes in electricity demand. It is therefore critical to account properly for changes in the amount and composition of economic activity.
Increases in the "amount" of economic activity are well reflected in GDP growth. Indeed, many previous cross-national studies have focused exclusively on the link between energy consumption and macroeconomic growth (Nordhaus 1975; Ezzati and Pinto 1979; Hoffman 1979; Siddayao 1986; Bhatia 1987) , often without considering supply-side factors (political or otherwise). The current analysis shares with this broad class of studies the use of GDP growth as an indicator of electricity demand growth. Because the dependent variable is measured on a per capita basis, the specific variable used to measure demand growth is the percentage change in real GDP per capita (?GDPPC).
GDP data can also be used to measure shifts in the composition of economic activity. It is expected that, all else being equal, richer countries will exhibit successively higher levels of electricity demand per capita. For example, aggregate economic output may initially be agricultural in nature, but later come to reflect a proportionally larger industrial component as the economy grows. Thus, the level of GDP per capita (GDPPC) contains information about the amount of incremental electricity demand associated with an arbitrary amount of GDP growth.
Specification
The independent variables do not all enter into the econometric specification in a simple additive fashion. Our hypotheses relate to the effect of the level of political constraints on infrastructure deployment, conditional on the level of interest group competition; and the effect of interest group competition on infrastructure deployment, conditional on the level of political constraints. Testing for conditional effects requires that the econometric specification include multiplicative interaction terms among the measures of interest (Friedrich 1982; Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan 1990) . The inclusion of such interaction terms permits statistical evaluation of conditional effects. The core econometric specification to which the basic model and these considerations give rise is: where the subscripts i and t are cross-sectional (country) and time period indices, the notation ∆X t represents the percentage change in the variable X between period t -1 and period t, and lnX represents the natural logarithm of X. The variable names are those defined in the text above.
Several comments regarding the specification are in order. First, because the distribution of the variables measuring the existing penetration level (CAPACITY), real per capita income level (GDPPC) and real per capita capital budget are skewed to the left, the natural logarithm of these variables is used rather than their raw levels. Second, to address potential concerns regarding endogeneity, we use one-year lagged values of the independent variables.
We also include a vector of country dummies to address the possibility of omitted country-level determinants of infrastructure penetration growth, such as colonial legacies; sociocultural divisions; the sectoral composition of output as determined by natural resource endowments; and deployment costs, which may differ based on geography, wages, and the real cost of equipment. We include a vector of year dummies as well in order to capture sample-wide inter-temporal effects such as technological innovation and increased globalization. Additionally, because we want to make sure that we have controlled for demand as thoroughly as possible, we employ variable rotation using a number of other possible determinants of demand, as described below. 
Results
The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares. Because the error term is expected to exhibit within-country serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, we employ a robust covariance matrix estimator based on that developed by Newey and West (1987) in order to correct the standard errors. This covariance matrix estimator is consistent in the presence of within-unit serial correlation up to a specified lag 16 and heteroskedasticity of unknown form. It differs from the original Newey-West version in that it is constructed for use in a panel setting rather than a conventional time-series setting .
17,18 Table 4 reports the estimation results. In addition to estimating the core specification described above, we estimate several variants of the core specification in order to assess the robustness of the results. Columns two through six include other potential determinants of expected demand on the right hand side of the equation. Additionally, in columns seven through 11, we re-estimate the core specification for different sub-samples that exclude outliers (five percent of the mass from the tails of the distribution of each of the independent variables),
OECD countries and countries with significant private-sector participation in electricity generation. We comment on each of these variants in our discussion below.
Consider the first column in Table 4 , which contains the results obtained by applying the core specification to the full sample. With the exception of the income growth variable (∆GDPPC), the capital budget variable (CAPBUDGET) and certain time period and country dummies, the coefficient estimate on each variable or interaction term is individually significant at a p-value of 0.03 or less. However, as noted earlier, the coefficients on the interaction terms and the variables included in these terms are not meaningful in the context of the conditional hypotheses proposed in Section 3. Rather, the hypotheses pertain to the total effects on penetration growth (∆CAPACITY) of (1) to its maximum observed level of 0.92, the same increase in POLCON yields a predicted increase in annual penetration growth of over five percentage points. The positive effect of political constraints on annual infrastructure penetration growth is therefore greater in the presence of stronger interest group competition, which increases the probability that a given policy change will be inimical to the interests of the utility.
On the other hand, the total effect of POLCON when IGC is set to its mean value minus one standard deviation (0.33) is -0.08 with an associated p-value of 0.10, implying that an increase of one standard deviation in the value of POLCON (0.36) on average leads to a predicted decrease in the annual penetration growth rate of almost three percentage points. As IGC falls, the size of the negative effect of POLCON on annual penetration growth increases in economic and statistical significance. When IGC is set to its minimum observed level of 0.06, for example, the same increase in POLCON yields a predicted decrease in annual penetration growth of almost seven percentage points. These results imply that, when the utility faces weak interest group competition and therefore a higher probability that a given policy shift will be favorable, relatively high levels of political constraints that limit the ability of political actors to offer favorable policy changes provide a negative effect on investment.
Now consider the total effect of interest group competition on penetration growth, conditional on the level of POLCON. In this case, the quantities of interest are the estimated values of ( )
and their associated standard errors at different levels of POLCON (both calculated analogously to the previous case). Table 5 reports different values of Β IGC and the associated p-values when the initial conditions variable (CAPACITY t-1 ) is held at its sample mean value and POLCON is set to different values.
Hypothesis H2 implies that, when POLCON is low, the total effect of IGC on penetration growth should be negative. Consistent with this hypothesis, the total effect of IGC on penetration growth when POLCON is held at its mean or mean minus one standard deviation is in each case negative with a p-value of 0.01 or lower. For example, when POLCON is set to its sample mean value (0.34), an increase in IGC of one standard deviation (0.14) reduces penetration growth by over four percentage points. This effect increases to over six percentage points when political constraints are set at the mean minus one standard deviation. However, the effect of IGC on penetration growth is indistinguishable from zero when POLCON grows larger than one standard deviation above the mean. The results are therefore consistent with Hypothesis H2: utilities operating in the absence of constraints on political actors invest less as interest group competition rises. However, when the level of political constraints is high enough, the level of interest group competition that a utility faces does not have a statistically significant effect on investment. Furthermore, in no case does an increase in interest group competition lead to increased investment. Figure 2 , the empirical analogue of Figure 1 , portrays these results graphically by plotting the predicted effect of interest group competition on annual penetration growth when political constraints are at their maximum and minimum levels. Now consider briefly the total effect of the third variable contained in the interaction terms, the initial penetration level (CAPACITY t-1 ). Table 5 above that a country's composition of economic activity shifts toward more electricity-intensive applications as wealth increases, thereby leading to increased per capita demand for electricity. It is also consistent with the notion of disequilibrium in the context of capital growth, and thus may explain the lack of statistical significance of the change in income variable (∆GDPPC).
Specifically, real and financial resource constraints limit the amount of capital that can be deployed in any one period. 20 Indeed, like the macroeconomic growth literature, the conjecture that the initial level of infrastructure penetration should be inversely related to the rate of penetration growth implicitly assumes that a new steady-state equilibrium penetration level cannot be attained in the short term. 21 Because it is also likely to be the case that the severity of resource constraints in a country is inversely related to its level of wealth-i.e., that richer countries not only have proportionally more demand for electricity-intensive applications, but can also devote proportionally more resources to building infrastructure to meet this demandthe income level variable (GDPPC) may be picking up not only shifts in the composition of demand toward more electricity-intensive applications, but also a "raising" of capital constraints in richer countries. It is important to recognize that this argument does not imply that the constraints in richer countries are not binding, but rather that richer countries can sustain higher rates of penetration growth given that their resource constraints are binding. Binding resource constraints, in turn, would lead to the absence of an observed relationship between demand growth (as measured by ∆GDPPC ) and infrastructure penetration growth.
The country-specific dummy variables may also be capturing the relevant cross-national differences in demand not explained by variation in income levels. This conjecture is supported by the lack of statistical significance of any of the variables rotated in in columns two through six. Neither population density, urban population percentage, value added in industry, value added in manufacturing nor value added in services provides additional explanatory power to the core specification. The variable rotation analysis also indicates the robustness of the econometric results: in no case do the coefficients of central interest change substantially when one of these variables is introduced into the analysis. Furthermore, the reported results are insensitive to influential data points, as demonstrated by the stability of the results when the country-years containing five percent of the mass from the tails of the distribution of each of the independent variables of interest are removed in columns seven through nine.
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We also estimate the core specification for two specific subsamples. Column 10 reports the results for the subsample of country-years with public sector provision of electrical generation only. This subsample accounts for the majority of observations in the full sample, and the results are nearly identical to those reported in column one. We do not report results for the subsample of country-years with significant private sector participation in the provision of electricity generation because the number of observations in this subsample is so small.
Because it is plausible that the nature of policymaking and demand for electricity varies systematically between industrialized and developing countries, we also report results in column 11 for a subsample that excludes OECD countries. The results are qualitatively similar in this case to those reported in column (1), although the magnitude of the effect of political constraints is diminished. 
Conclusion
The empirical results presented above are consistent with our hypotheses. Higher levels of political constraints increase investment in the face of stronger interest group competition.
However, when interest group competition is sufficiently weak, lower levels of political constraints may actually produce more investment as utilities exploit the potential for favorable policies. While our sample is predominately state owned enterprises, we believe that the theoretical arguments that we offer regarding the importance of considering both the ease with which government officials can alter the status quo policy regime and the likelihood that such change will be inimical or favorable to the investor (public or private) are quite general.
Further, the theoretical arguments bring together four accomplished theoretical and empirical literatures demonstrating linkages between the structure of a nation's political institutions and the investment strategies of public and private firms in those countries. Rather than emphasize the danger to private investors from opportunistic government changes in policy that shift quasi-rents to consumers, competitors or other related firms, our theoretical perspective allows the likelihood of such behavior to differ across countries and, though not examined in this analysis, potentially across firms with different hazard mitigating capabilities as well. Rather than emphasize the potential for corruption and overinvestment in state owned enterprises, we allow the likelihood of such behavior to vary as well. The strength of interest group competition influences the likelihood of political interference for both private and public firms and should be a primary component of an integrated investment strategy in both cases.
These arguments imply that investors in the electricity sector and more generally should not merely assess the extent to which the political institutions in a country limit the feasibility of policy change. Instead, as suggested by Willrich:
"We must see through the opaque front a national government tries to present to the rest of the world and take proper account of the dynamic balance of forces within each nation and the transnational links among them. No government is monolithic, whether it be a parliamentary democracy, a proletarian dictatorship, or a feudal monarchy. Government policy regarding an important matter such as energy results from a complex and endless process of domestic political bargaining, even within the most authoritarian regimes. Moreover, special interest groups in different countries are more or less continuously engaged in developing and dissolving transnational links to influence government policies" (Willrich 1975, pp. 5-6) .
Although the analysis that we have presented here does not take into account all of the many elements of political bargaining that shape government policy, we believe that it is a step in the right direction. It offers substantial support for our assertion that managers taking international investment or other strategic decisions should assess not only the level of commitment offered by the government, but also the level of interest group competition present in the polity.
-33- Note: To perform the necessary calculations, all other variables are held at their mean level and the mean value of the coefficients on the year and country dummies is employed.
3 General examples of a firm's interest group competitors could include the consumers of the firm's products, unions representing its workforce, upstream suppliers, downstream purchasers of the firm's output, or producers of substitute goods 4 More recent work focusing explicitly on non-market strategy develops considerably more elaborate models of constituent competition in the political arena (see for example Snyder 1992; Baron 1994) . 5 The notion that political institutions and interest group competition interact to affect investment strategies builds on . 6 More general arguments regarding the link between policy uncertainty and investment by private sector actors may be found in .
7 Information asymmetries between the regulator and the regulated firm can also produce this effect. 8 For ease of exposition, the analysis in the text abstracts from the interest group competition that takes place between industrial and non-industrial consumers. There are several reasons why political price discrimination between these categories of consumers is not by itself likely to achieve political actors' distributive objectives. First, regardless of the level of cross-subsidy, utilities and industrial consumers will continue to prefer prices that that are respectively higher and lower in absolute terms. Second, the share of non-industrial consumption of electricity at any given price-and thus the amount of surplus generated thereby-necessarily varies inversely with the fraction of electricity consumed by industrial customers. As a result, there is less surplus available for transfer in precisely the situations in which the (political) demand by industrial consumers for such transfers is stronger. Third, there are practical constraints on the extent of price discrimination that is feasible based on the relative price elasticities of various consumer classes. The practice by political actors of political price discrimination therefore does not undermine the analysis in the text, but rather represents a complementary mechanism for redistribution that we plan to examine in subsequent research.
9 Industrial users may also continue to lobby for price reductions once optimal levels of investment are reached. Such behavior need not reflect myopia (lack of foresight regarding the subsequent impact on investment in the sector and the reliability of supply) but rather from the assumption that the benefits that they receive today in terms of lower costs outweigh the discounted present value of the costs that they will have to bear in the future. In this regard, it is important to note that these costs need not be proportionately allocated, but rather, industrial users may be able to shift the burden to residential or commercial users of electricity or the general tax base. Examples of such cost-shifting include the implementation of lower electricity rates for industrial users who agree to have their supplies cut in the event of power shortages.
10 Moreover, as we measure political constraints by appealing to the checks and balances provided by the introduction of additional veto points into the political system, higher political constraints are also associated with enhanced oversight of the managers of state-owned enterprises by multiple political actors. Such oversight reduces the feasibility of empire-building.
11 These results echo those produced in similar work by (Hammond and Butler 1996; Tsebelis 2000) . 12 The other critical assumption that produces this result is that of "transitional disequilibrium," as countries cannot instantaneously attain their desired stock levels.
13 However, the core arguments regarding the effects of political constraints and interest group competition on infrastructure deployment do not rest on this assumption.
14 Strictly speaking, the implication is lower average costs. It may still be that a larger proportion of the average cost of a unit of electricity produced consists of the return to capital because larger, more efficient generating units are more capital-intensive. The greater intensity of usage of large baseload units compared to less capital-intensive but less frequently used units, however, results in higher returns per unit of available generating capital when the within-territory demand for electricity is larger and more variegated. 15 Recent experience in New Zealand, where the failure of long-distance transmission lines led to an extended blackout in the capital city of Auckland, underscores the importance of this factor (Wichter 1998) . 16 The "lag window" is set to three, meaning that the estimator is robust to serial correlation up to degree three. The reported results are robust to the use of one year, five year and ten year windows.
17 Compared with the alternative procedure of estimating one or more AR(n) terms, the use of the robust covariance matrix estimator has three major advantages. First, it is computationally simpler. Second, it easily accommodates serial correlation that is of higher order than one. Third, it does not rely on an assumption that the different cross-sectional units share common autocorrelation parameters. Failure to make this assumption in the estimation of AR(n) models creates a need to estimate many additional parameters, which reduces the efficiency of the point estimator.
18 The conventional Newey-West covariance matrix estimator is:
( ) ( ) and X is the regressor matrix, x t is a vector representing row t of the regressor matrix, T is the number of time-series observations, K is the number of regressors, e t is a consistent estimator of the disturbances, and L is the lag truncation (i.e., the maximum order of autocorrelation to which the estimator is robust).
The panel version is a straightforward extension of the conventional time-series version. Under the assumption that the N cross-sectional units are independent, S n is constructed for each unit n, and the resulting N values are then averaged to obtain a consistent estimator of S. See Driscoll and Kraay (1998), Froot (1989) and . Thanks to Aart Kraay for sharing his insights on this topic. 
